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Abstract: 
This paper links empirical literature on the use of price as an entry deterring mechanism with 
literature on the effect of multi-market contact on competition.  The analysis uses a dataset of 
cable TV system prices to provide evidence that incumbent cable TV firms use price to deter 
entry by telecom overbuilders as well as cities with municipal utilities.  There is also some 
evidence that multi-market contact with telecom overbuilders results in lower prices. However, 
there is no evidence that incumbents use price to deter cable overbuilders.  In addition to linking 
entry deterrence with multi-market contact, this study has two other unique features.  First, it 
establishes entry deterrence using two techniques, one of which relies on theory by Ellison and 
Ellison (2008) on non-monotonic price decreases in response to entry probability.  Second, it 
uses detailed price and channel data at the service tier level.   
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1. Introduction  
The goal of this paper is to link empirical literature on the use of price as an entry deterring 
mechanism with literature on the effect of multi-market contact on competition.  The paper 
accomplishes this within the context of the US cable TV industry.  The cable TV industry is an 
important industry to understand from a public policy point of view; it is a $100+B per year 
industry in the US and the average adult spends about four hours per day watching TV.  From a 
methodological point of view, there are many attractive features of the industry that allow for 
careful identification of incumbents and entrants.  In particular, this paper tests whether or not 
incumbent monopolists use price as a way to deter potential entry and whether multi-market 
contact between the incumbent and potential entrant modifies the extent to which the incumbent 
will use price to deter entry.  The analyses find no evidence that incumbent cable TV firms use 
price to deter entry by cable overbuilders, but there is evidence that incumbents use price to deter 
entry by telecom overbuilders and municipal utilities.  Identification in the case of municipal 
utilities comes from cross-sectional variation in the presence of municipal utilities in some cities 
and temporal variation from states that pass laws restricting municipal utility entry.  
Identification of entry deterrence in the case of telecom overbuilders comes from cross sectional 
and temporal variation in the distance to potential entrants.  The identification is aided by 
additional temporal variation from states that switch to state-wide franchises as well as from 
theory and tests developed by Ellison and Ellison (2007) which suggests that an incumbent’s 
entry deterring response will be a non-monotonic function of the probability of entry.  In 
addition, there is evidence that multi-market contact plays a strong moderating role when the 
incumbent faces potential telecom entry.  Firms not in multi-market contact with potential 
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telecom entrants appear less likely to use entry deterrence, whereas firms in multi-market contact 
with potential telecom entrants appear to price lower. 
 
Ellison and Ellison (2007) show that under certain conditions, investment A(z) will be a 
monotonic function of a characteristic z of the market when entry deterrence motivations are 
absent. They suggest that characteristic z might be the number of potential customers in the 
market. The conditions under which monotonicity holds are that profits for the entrant are 
increasing in z, and the direct and competition effects are the same direction (either both positive 
or both negative). The direct effect of z on A(z) will be positive if an increase in z raises the 
marginal benefit of the investment more than the marginal cost; the competition effect of z on 
A(z) is positive if the marginal benefit of z is larger when firm 1 is a duopolist than when a 
monopolist. The result lends itself to a simple test: if A(z) is not a monotonic function of z , then 
entry deterrence motivations are present. Ellison and Ellison (2007) provide details of the model, 
its proofs, a simulation and an application to the pharmaceutical industry.  In their application to 
the pharmaceutical industry, Ellison and Ellison consider a number of mechanisms through 
which the incumbent might deter entry including price and advertising.  The link between price 
and investment has been made elsewhere in the literature. Bagwell (1993) develops a model of 
entry deterrence in which the incumbent first chooses to invest I in a technology of cost c(I), and 
then uses price P to signal the level of investment to a potential entrant. A low price signals that 
the incumbent has invested a large amount in lowering cost.  Similarly, Milgrom and Roberts 
(1982a) show low prices can deter entry when information is asymmetric. 
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The only other paper of which we are aware that uses the theory and methodology outlined by 
Ellison and Ellison (2007) is by Dafny (2005) who shows that hospitals invest in surgical 
procedure volume to move down a learning curve and thereby deter potential entrants.  Dafny 
adapts the Ellison and Ellison model to a situation where investment by the incumbent is 
observed, as are the number of potential entrants, but not the underlying characteristic (z) that 
determines the attractiveness of the market.  Additional conditions regarding complementarities 
of inputs into quality are required.  Dafny shows that as the number of potential entrants 
increase, the incumbent hospital responds by increasing surgical procedure volume in a non-
monotonic fashion; the incumbent increases volume more when there are two potential entrants 
compared to when there are 4+ potential entrants.  Again, the intuition is straightforward: as the 
probability of entry becomes very high, there is less incentive to deter the entrant.   
 
Several other papers investigate incumbent use of price to deter entry, and find mixed results.  
Goolsbee & Syverson (2008) show that incumbent airlines drop price in response to increases in 
threat of entry from Southwest.  Simon (2005) focuses on post entry actions of the incumbent 
and finds that newer incumbents in the magazine industry cut prices in response to entry more 
aggressively than older incumbents.  In a study closely related to this one, Savage and Wirth 
(2005) find that potential entrants have no effect on incumbent cable TV firm prices, but do have 
a positive effect on the number of channels offered by the incumbent.  This study differs from 
Savage and Wirth in several ways.  Savage and Wirth use a probit model to predict entry 
whereas this study uses the distance between an entrant and incumbent to predict entry.  In 
addition, this study does not use number of channels, but instead uses a hedonic approach to 
decompose price across all available channels, as will be described below.  This study also 
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focuses on the use of price to deter entry by cities with municipal electric utilities; it builds off of 
work by Seamans (2008) showing that incumbent cable firms use technology upgrades to deter 
entry by cities with municipal utilities.  It is possible that incumbent cable TV firms also use 
price as an entry deterring mechanism when confronted with potential city entry.  Finally, this 
study uses a panel dataset to focus on the effect of multi-market contact on pricing decisions over 
time.  Unlike irreversible sunk cost investments, prices can be adjusted over time as conditions 
change.  Such inter-temporal considerations are central to any study that focuses on price 
(Williamson, 1977). 
 
Theory on pre-entry effects of multi-market contact in the economics literature dates to work by 
Milgrom and Roberts (1982b) who suggest that the returns to an incumbent from dropping price 
to deter an entrant will be increasing in the number of markets that the incumbent operates.  
Their model relies on information asymmetry between the two firms. When the incumbent firm 
drops price low enough, the entrant infers that the incumbent is a low cost provider, and is 
deterred from entering (if it infers the cost is low enough to make entry unprofitable).  If the 
incumbent operates in multiple markets, and encounters the same potential entrant in those 
markets, then there is additional incentive for the incumbent to invest in establishing a reputation 
as a low cost provider.  While theory suggests that pre-entry multi-market contact leads to price 
decreases, theory also suggests that post-entry multi-market contact leads to price increases.  
Bernheim and Whinston (1990) develop a model of multi-market contact that suggests when 
more than one firm is in the market and the firms are different from each other there are 
increasing incentives to engage in mutual cooperation when interacting across multiple markets.  
Hughes and Oughton (1993) suggest that multi-market contact may increase incentives to engage 
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in collusive behavior; a strategy that has become known as “mutual forbearance” (Bernheim and 
Whinston, 1990).   
 
Empirical work on multi-market contact primarily focuses on post-entry interactions.  Results 
tend to support the prediction that multi-market contact leads to higher prices.  In a cross 
industry study, Hughes and Oughton (1993) find that price-cost margins are higher in industries 
with greater multi-market contact.  Heggestad and Rhoades (1978) find that multi-market contact 
in the banking industry leads to less rivalry.  Baum and Korn (1999) find that rates of entry and 
exit into airline routes vary in a curvilinear way with the amount of multi-market contact 
between pairs of competitors.  This paper adds to empirical literature on multi-market contact by 
considering pre-entry actions of the incumbent and linking entry deterrence motives with multi-
market contact in the context of the cable TV industry.  Incumbent cable TV firms appear not to 
use price to deter entry by cable overbuilder entrants, but do appear to use price to deter entry by 
telecom overbuilder entrants.  The differing response may be due to information asymmetries 
between incumbent cable firms and telecom entrants.  In addition, results show that firms in 
multi-market contact with potential telecom entrants have lower prices than those firms not in 
multi-market contact with potential entrants. 
 
The next section of the paper provides background on the cable TV industry.  Section 3 then 
describes the data and methods used.  Section 4 discusses results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
Pricing and Multi-Market Contact in the Cable TV Industry 
6 
2. Cable TV Industry 
The contractual relationship between the city and the cable firm is governed by a franchise 
agreement which typically runs 10-15 years in length.  Due to various changes in regulation, by 
2003 franchise renewals are more or less automatic and are non-exclusive, meaning that a city 
can enter as a competitor or invite other firms to enter as competitors, and most cable rates are 
unregulated (Crandall, Sidak &Singer, 2006).   Even though franchises are non-exclusive, 99% 
of cities have only one incumbent cable system.  Cable systems face competition in the video 
market in the form of digitally broadcast satellite (DBS) providers, and competition in the 
broadband market in the form of digital subscriber line service (DSL) offered by telecom 
companies.  DBS providers were not a serious competitor until after the 1999 Satellite Home 
Viewer Improvement Act (SHVIA) that allowed DBS providers to carry local signals; but by 
2003 DBS coverage was more or less ubiquitous (Crawford, 2006).   
 
While most cities have one incumbent cable TV provider, in the late 1990s, several private 
companies were formed with the explicit purpose of entering and competing with incumbent 
cable TV firms.  Companies such as RCN and Knology built their own cable networks; 
companies such as Qwest and Verizon created subsidiaries to use existing telephone 
infrastructure to offer video.  Collectively, these private entrants are called “overbuilders”.  
Typically, overbuilders will focus on a specific geographic area.  For example, in its 2005 
Annual Report, RCN notes that its strategy is to selectively expand its footprint: “RCN will 
continue to seek opportunities to increase its network footprint within and adjacent to its existing 
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market clusters.”1  Building off of the existing footprint allows the private overbuilder to take 
advantage of economies of scale in customer service and maintenance and repair.  Thus, in 
principle one can measure the threat of entry from an overbuilder by measuring the distance in 
miles from an incumbent system and the edge of the closest cluster of overbuilders. 
An explicit intention of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was to encourage use of electric 
utility infrastructure to increase competition in telecommunications and video programming 
services.  Electric utilities, including city-owned municipal electric utilities, own infrastructure 
that can be used to build out cable TV and other telecommunications services. There are several 
reasons city governments in particular are able to enter at low cost.  First, cities with municipal 
utilities may be able to take advantage of economies of scope.  Service trucks and customer 
service representatives can be used to serve the same customers; existing fiber optic networks 
can be used for the cable TV network.  Many local governments operate public 
telecommunications infrastructure (often called i-Nets) that connects city departments; Gillet, 
Lehr and Osorio (2006) have suggested that existence of these i-Nets leads to economies of 
scope and learning effects that drop the cost to the city of installing and operating its own cable 
TV system.  Local governments may be able to use tax-free financing in the form of municipal 
bonds to build out cable TV networks.  As a result of the foregoing, following full 
implementation of TA96, a number of cities have entered and started to provide cable TV 
service; by 2002, close to 100 cities provided cable TV service (Gillett, Lehr, Osorio, 2004).  For 
example, Alameda Power & Telecom, a municipal electric utility in Alameda, California, used 
its existing utility infrastructure to build a cable system in 2001.   
 
                                                 
1
 RCN SEC Form 10-K, page six.  Available for download here: http://investor.rcn.com/downloads/4-10-
06_10KA.pdf  
Pricing and Multi-Market Contact in the Cable TV Industry 
8 
In many cases cities need voter or state approval before offering their own telecommunications 
system and the presence of laws regarding these legal requirements add to the fixed cost of 
setting up a system.  A number of states have proposed and passed legislation that limits a city’s 
ability to provide its own cable TV service.  Some states prohibit the city from using the 
municipal utility to cross subsidize new businesses such as telecom or cable, whereas other states 
allow cities to offer telecom or cable services after receiving voter approval. 2  After such a law is 
passed, cities with municipal utilities may no longer have a low cost advantage; while in some 
cases they may still be able to use the municipal utility infrastructure, they may need to incur 
additional costs to satisfy state legislation.  In addition, a number of states have switched from a 
franchising system that is performed at the city level to a state-wide franchising system.3  This 
means that if a new entrant wants to offer video services to any city in the state, the entrant need 
only negotiate once with the state instead of with each individual city.   
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data and Variable Construction 
Data comes from Warren Communications Cable TV Factbook for three different time periods: 
October 2003, January 2006 and August 2008.  The Factbook data is the main source of cable 
TV system level characteristics used in most empirical studies of the industry.4 All cable 
variables are measured at the system level.  2003 is late enough after the passage of SHVIA that 
DBS coverage is more or less ubiquitous, which lessens the extent to which any effect we find is 
                                                 
2
 States that passed no cross subsidy legislation include Florida, Tennessee, Utah and Virginia prior to 2003, Iowa, 
South Carolina in 2003 and Wisconsin in 2005.  States that had other forms of restrictions include Alabama, 
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, Texas prior to 2003, Washington in 2003 and Pennsylvania in 2005. 
3
 States that enacted state franchises for video programming include Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Rhode Island and 
Vermont prior to 2003, Texas in 2005, California, Indiana, Kansas, and Michigan in 2007. 
4
 For recent examples, see Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) and Della Vigna and Kaplan (2007).  
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driven by unobserved heterogeneity in the presence of DBS offerings.  The empirical analyses 
include two steps.  The first step involves using information on price and channel at the service 
level to estimate a hedonic price for each system-service level observation.  One of the unique 
features of this study is the use of detailed information on price and channels for each level of 
service.  19 service tiers are included as fixed effects in most regressions.  There were an 
additional 14 service tiers that were used infrequently across the three years of data and dropped; 
dropping the extra service tiers resulted in reducing the total number of observations by less than 
1%.  It is important to note that other studies which have looked at cable TV system pricing have 
focused on only one tier of pricing, typically the basic service tier.  The problem with using the 
pricing of only one tier of service is that channel lineups for a tier may be arranged differently 
across systems.  For example, the Cartoon Network is marketed in different tiers in different 
cities.  It appears along with 32 other channels in the basic tier in Stockton, CA, along with 43 
other channels in the expanded basic tier in Alameda, CA, and along with 67 other channels in 
the digital basic tier in Bakersfield, CA.  The methodology used in this paper explicitly captures 
the differences across systems by using service tier and channel lineups.  For 2003, there were 
over 600 channels, for 2006, there were over 800 channels and for 2008 there were over 1000 
channels.  In addition, many of the channel names change from year to year.  This poses an 
empirical challenge.  One approach would be to match channels across years as best as possible, 
but the problem with this approach is that, incorrect matches aside, there would be a number of 
channels not used, especially those channels from later time periods.  The approach taken here 
uses all channel and price information to estimate a hedonic price regression separately for each 
year, then uses the estimated coefficients from the price regression to predict price for each 
system – service level observation for each year.  That is, the following regression is estimated: 
Pricing and Multi-Market Contact in the Cable TV Industry 
10 
 
(1) ln(monthly_fee+1)i = α0 + Σj=1-19 αjservicelevelj + Σk=1-K αkchannelk +εi 
 
Separate regressions are run for each year, so K = 661 in 2003, K = 873 in 2006 and K = 1078 in 
2008.  The estimated coefficients (α) are then used to predict ln(monthly_fee+1), which for 
simplicity we call price in regression equations below. 
 
The most important independent variables used are indicators for potential entrants.  Municipal 
utility indicates if a system is in a city that has a municipal utility provider.  Cities with 
municipal utilities are able to use the municipal utility infrastructure to build out a cable system 
that competes with the incumbent.  Data on municipal utilities was collected from the American 
Public Power Association.  Counts of the number of overbuilders within a 100 mile radius are 
used to measure threat of private entry.  These variables are constructed by setting a radius of 
100 miles from the center of the incumbent’s county and counting the number of overbuilders in 
counties that fall within that radius.  Cable and telecom overbuilders are identified from owner 
information provided in the Factbook.  The simplest measure is just a dummy for whether the 
count is greater than zero, but the count variables are also broken into five bins for 0, 1, 2, 3, 4+ 
overbuilders within 100 miles.5  Summary statistics of the overbuilder bins, by number and type 
of overbuilder, are provided in Table 1, as is information on municipal electric utility.  A 
distribution of the number of overbuilders within 100 miles, by type, is presented in Figure 1.  
While there is a long tail to the distribution, dropping the outliers or changing the bin size does 
not qualitatively alter the results. 
                                                 
5
 In other words, the dummy for when the count within 100 miles is greater than zero is just (1-bin for zero 
overbuilders in 100 miles). 
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The system ownership information is also used to create two additional control variables.  The 
log of number of systems owned by the firm is included to control for firm size (as distinct from 
system size).  Larger firms may have access to more resources such as bank loans or public 
market financing that enable them to more easily invest in entry deterring mechanisms. Regional 
ownership may also be important.  Share of systems owned by the firm within each Designated 
Market Area (DMA) are calculated.  The DMA assigns each city in the US to an area that is 
believed to receive the same media offerings.  In most cases there is only one cable system per 
city, so cable systems do not compete with each other for residential customers.  However, a 
portion of cable system revenue is in the form of advertising revenue.  For example, in 2006, 
$1.5B of Comcast’s $24.1B in revenue came from advertising.   If a cable firm controls many 
systems in a DMA it may be able to exercise market power over local and regional businesses 
that want to advertise on a cable network.  DMA level share is included to capture any such 
effects.  Homes passed is a count of the number of potential hookups that the incumbent cable 
system passes.  Factbook also contains information on the miles of cable installed in the system, 
which is included to measure system size. The number of offair channels (at the system level) is 
included to control for the number of local stations that a system is required to carry, which may 
reduce the number of other satellite channels the system is able to carry. 
 
A duopoly dummy indicates if the system competes directly with another system in the same 
city.  A dummy private overbuilder indicates if the system is owned by either a telecom or cable 
overbuilder.  These variables, together with ownership information, were used to create multi-
market contact variables.  A firm which owns a system that is in a duopoly with a private 
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overbuilder is coded as having multi-market contact.  Separate variables are created for multi-
market (cable) and multi-market (telecom) depending on whether the incumbent has interaction 
with one or the other type of potential entrant.6  By 2001, the start of the data, digital broadcast 
satellite (DBS) availability was more or less ubiquitous.  Other researchers have accounted for 
competition from DBS indirectly using demographic control variables.7  Using a similar 
approach, DBS is accounted for using various demographic controls at the county level.  The 
controls used are median household income, percent of population living in a rural area, and 
population per square mile.8  The demographic data are from the City and County Databook.    
 
3.2. Methodology 
OLS models are used for all regressions.  The main empirical specification for testing the effect 
of municipal electric utility is: 
 
(2) priceit = β0 + βmmunicpalutilityi + βxXit  + εit  
 
X includes all the cable system or cable firm characteristics as well as demographic control 
variables and fixed effects.  Note that the municipal utility variable only varies in the cross 
section.  Temporal variation comes from the passage of state laws restricting the city’s ability to 
                                                 
6
 Not surprisingly, whether a firm is considered a multi-market contact firm or not is correlated with its size; 
correlations between log number of systems and with multi-market contact (cable) is 0.55, and with multi-market 
contact (telco) is 0.37. 
7
 For example, Savage and Wirth (2005) account for DBS using the percentage of the population living in a rural 
area, the percentage of households living in multiple dwelling units, and the cable system operator’s share of 
national systems.  
8
 Other variables were considered such as population, number of households, and percentage of households living in 
multiple dwelling units but these variables were found to be highly correlated with income, rural and population per 
square mile.  The rural variable is important to include as prior studies have demonstrated that cable service is 
highly inelastic in rural areas (Mayo and Otsuka, 1991). 
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cross subsidize a cable system with revenues from the utility.  The main empirical specifications 
for testing the effects of private overbuilders are: 
 
(3a) priceit = β0 + βtNonzero telecom overbuilders within 100milesit + βxXit + εit  
(4a) priceit = β0 + βcNonzero cable overbuilders within 100milesit + βxXit + εit  
 
Temporal variations in the use of state franchises for video programming are used to aid 
identification.  Additional regressions use different bins in an attempt to use non-monotonicities 
in the incumbent’s response to potential entry to identify entry deterrence: 
 
(3b) priceit = β0 + Σi=1-4 βiI(number telecom overbuilders within 100 miles=i) + βxXit  + εit 
(4b) priceit = β0 + Σi=1-4 βiI(number cable overbuilders within 100 miles=i) + βxXit  + εit 
 
 
The bin for 0 overbuilders within 100 miles has been omitted.  The approach in (3b) and (4b) is 
the approach followed by Dafny (2005).  Under this approach, a significant coefficient on βi and 
βi< β>i would indicate non-monotonicity in the pricing decision of the incumbent.  For example, 
if β1 was negative and significant, and β4 was zero or positive, there would be evidence that the 
incumbent engages in non-monotonic pricing by dropping price more when the probability of 
entry is in an intermediate range than when price is highly likely (which we assume is the case 
when there are many overbuilders nearby).  Dafny (2005) explicitly compares β1 to β4, but in 
principle β2 could be used instead of β1 as will be done in some specifications below. 
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Effects of multi-market contact are investigated for those cases where the potential entrant is a 
telecom or cable overbuilder; a city with a municipal utility poses threat of entry in only a single 
market so is not considered in a multi-market context.  In order to investigate the effect of multi-
market contact, the following specifications are used: 
 
(5a) priceit = β0 + Σi=1-4 βiI(number telecom overbuilders within 100 miles=i) + Σi=1-4 
βi_mmcI(number telecom overbuilders within 100 miles=i)*MMC measure for telecomit +βxXit  +εit 
 
(5b) priceit = β0 + Σi=1-4 βiI(number cable overbuilders within 100 miles=i) + Σi=1-4 
βi_mmcI(number cable overbuilders within 100 miles=i)*MMC measure for cableit +βxXit  +εit 
 
Where the MMC measure depends on whether the type of overbuilder is telecom or cable, and all 
other variables are as above.  The coefficients between the interaction term and its associated bin 
are compared.  βi_mmc < βi is taken to be evidence that multi-market contact raises incentives for 
firms to price lower. 
 
4. Results 
The results for all specifications are presented in Tables 2 – 5c.  In the interest of clarity of 
presentation, coefficients on all but the most important variables have been suppressed, but are 
available from the author upon request. 
 
Table 2 presents results from specification (2); the independent variable of interest is municipal 
utility.  Column 1 includes only year and service level fixed effects; column 2 adds in DMA 
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fixed effects; column 3 adds in system characteristics and county demographics.  In most cases 
the market will be defined at the designated market area (DMA).  The municipal utility variable 
does not vary with time, so a city fixed effects specification would wipe out any municipal utility 
effect.  The DMA assignment is at a high enough level that the city level and county level 
variables will not be washed out, but low enough to still control for local demographic and 
market characteristics not already included in the specifications.  There are 210 DMAs in the US.  
The negative coefficient on municipal utility in column 3, which is statistically significant at the 
1% level, indicates that the presence of a municipal utility is correlated with a lower price.  In 
order to determine the direction of causality, column 4 uses temporal variation from state laws 
that prohibit the city’s ability to cross subsidize cable service with revenues from the municipal 
utility.  The passage of these laws makes it more costly and hence less likely that the city will 
enter.  Hence, after passage of a law, we expect the incumbent system to be less likely to lower 
price in an attempt to deter city entry.  The coefficient of interest in column 4 is that on the 
interaction between municipal utility and no cross subsidy.  This variable is positive, as 
predicted, but not significant at standard levels (p-value = 0.11).  Taken as a whole, the evidence 
presented in Table 2 suggests that incumbent firms use price to deter municipal utility entry.   
 
Table 3a presents results from specification (3a); the independent variable of interest is potential 
telecom overbuilders>0.  Like Table 2, Table 3a adds in more controls in each column.  The 
negative coefficient in column 3 suggests that incumbent firms price lower when the threat of 
telecom entry rises; however, this coefficient is not statistically significant.  The goal of Table 3a 
is to use temporal variation from state laws to help identify whether incumbent firms use low 
prices to deter telecom overbuilder entry.  To this end, column 4 uses temporal variation from the 
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passage of state video programming franchise laws.  The passage of these laws makes it less 
costly and hence more likely that telecom overbuilders will enter.  Hence, after passage of a law, 
we expect the incumbent system to be more likely to lower price in an attempt to deter city entry.  
The coefficient on the interaction term in column 4 is negative and statistically significant at the 
1% level, as predicted.  Table 3b, representing the results of specification (3b) uses a different 
approach.  Here we focus on how the incumbent firm reacts to increases in the threat of telecom 
overbuilder entry.  Per Ellison and Ellison (2007), non-monotonic decreases in price to increases 
in threat of entry are taken as indications of entry deterrence.  Following the approach in Dafny 
(2005), this is accomplished by performing tests of equality between the coefficients on mutually 
exclusive bins representing probability of entry.  Columns 1-3 in Table 3b successively add in 
more controls.  The coefficients of interest are on the bins for 1, 2, 3 and 4+ telecom overbuilders 
within a 100 mile radius (the bin for 0 has been omitted).  None of the coefficients are 
statistically significant, but it does appear that the coefficient on the bin 2 is less than the 
coefficient on bin 4+.  Tests for coefficient equality suggest that we cannot reject equality at less 
than the 24% confidence level in any of the regressions.  In other words, there is scant evidence 
that the incumbent firm engages in non-monotonic price decreases to deter telecom overbuilder 
entry. 
 
Tables 4a and 4b repeat the analyses for the case of potential cable overbuilder entry.  However, 
there is little evidence that incumbent firms use price to deter cable overbuilder entry.  Changes 
to the state franchise law appear to raise prices when the potential entrant is a cable overbuilder, 
and there is no evidence of non-monotonic price decreases.  The former result would benefit 
from additional investigation in follow up work.  One possible explanation for the price increase 
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following passage of the state video franchise may entail incumbent cable firms and overbuilder 
cable firms working together to deter entry by telecom firms.  In order to better tease out this 
possibility, it will be necessary to model how and where state franchises are passed.   
 
Tables 5a-5c present findings on the effect of multi-market contact.  Column 1 of Table 5a 
shows that incumbent firms are more likely to lower price when they are in multi-market contact 
with potential telecom overbuilder entrants; the coefficient on the interaction term is negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level.  In contrast, column 2 of the same table shows that 
incumbent firms are statistically no more likely to lower price when in multi-market contact with 
potential cable overbuilder entrants.  Table 5b then investigates whether this basic relationship 
varies as the probability of entry increases by focusing on the coefficients on different bins.  For 
ease of exposition, tests of coefficient equality are presented in a separate Table 5c.  The results 
do not suggest any non-monotonic response to potential entry by firms in multi-market contact, 
but do verify the basic relationship uncovered in Table 5a: incumbent firms are more likely to 
price low to deter entry when the potential entrant is a telecom firm in multi-market contact with 
the incumbent.     
 
5. Conclusion 
The results of the analyses show evidence that incumbent firms use price to deter municipal 
electric utilities and potential telecom overbuilder entrants, but not potential cable overbuilder 
entrants.  Evidence of the use of price to deter entry primarily comes from temporal variation in 
state laws and less so from non-monotonic decreases in price in response to increased threat of 
entry.  Theory developed by Milgrom and Roberts (1982a) should help provide justification for 
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the differential response to cities with municipal electric utilities and telecom overbuilders on the 
one hand and cable overbuilders on the other.  In some cases, the monopolist incumbent may 
want to charge a price less than the monopoly price to signal low cost to potential entrants.  Of 
course, rational entrants possessing complete information will not be affected by such pricing.  
However, if cost information is private, then the low price may signal some information to the 
potential entrant and be a useful deterrent.  To the extent that there exist informational 
asymmetries in the video programming market, it is more likely to exist between the incumbent 
cable TV firm and potential telecom overbuilders or municipal electric utilities than between 
incumbents and potential cable overbuilders.  Not only do incumbents and cable overbuilders use 
much the same technology, but they have been interacting with each other for close to a decade.  
On the other hand, telecom entrants use different technology (for example, Verizon FiOS uses 
fiber-to-the-home) and only started to seriously enter the video programming market in the mid 
2000s.  RCN, the primary cable overbuilder, was founded in 1997 whereas Verizon FiOS did not 
have any communities online until 2005.9   
 
While here the focus is on informational asymmetries, the idea that asymmetries of any sort 
might affect outcomes is well established in the literature.  Collusion is illegal, but tacit collusion 
may be attainable if two firms in an industry are symmetric along all dimensions (Schelling, 
1960).  As the firms become more asymmetric along any one dimension, the coordination 
required to sustain a collusive outcome becomes more difficult (Scherer, 1980).  In the context of 
the video programming market, post entry coordination may be difficult for incumbent cable TV 
firms and telecom overbuilders because of asymmetries in technology.  As a result, post-entry 
                                                 
9
 While Verizon FiOS first went live in September 2005, the company had been obtaining video programming 
franchises from cities and building infrastructure before then: 
http://telephonyonline.com/technology/news/verizon_fios_keller_020305/ . 
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profits may be lower and, hence, we would expect the incumbent cable TV firm to use stronger 
ex-ante entry deterring strategies.  Similarly, there may be differences in objective functions of 
cities with municipal electric utilities and incumbent cable firms.  The city poses a threat in that, 
if it enters, it may pursue different objectives (Hauge, Jamison, Gentry, 2008).  Emmons and 
Prager (1997) show that public-private cable TV duopolies have prices 30-40% lower than 
private-private cable TV duopolies.  In addition, Bernheim and Whinston (1990) suggest that 
single market firms, which would be the case for the city should it enter, are likely to decrease 
the ability of an incumbent firm to rely on multi-market contact.   
 
The results also show that incumbent firms that are in multi-market contact with potential 
telecom entrants are more likely to have lower prices than firms not in multi-market contact with 
potential entrants.  There is much empirical evidence of high prices in the presence of multi-
market contact between existing firms (Hughes and Oughton, 1993; Baum and Korn, 1999) and 
the reason for this may rest on the ability of firms to collude (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990).  
But it is not clear that a similar result should hold for potential entrants, as pre-entry and post-
entry incentives may differ.  Milgrom and Roberts (1982b) suggest that multi-market contact 
should lead to lower prices when there exists information asymmetry.  One possible reason for 
the lack of lower prices when in multi-market contact with a cable overbuilder is that prior multi-
market contact between an incumbent and entrant has acted to reduce information asymmetry 
over time for a subset of firms that interact primarily with cable overbuilders, and these firms 
now have less incentive to drop price.  In contrast, telecom entrants and incumbents start to 
interact in the mid 2000s, so even by the end of the dataset (2008) there has only been a few 
years of interaction between the different firms, so there is still a high probability that 
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information asymmetry persists.  Hence, there may still be returns to pricing low to deter telecom 
overbuilder entry. 
 
While the analyses above used two approaches to identify entry deterring behavior when 
incumbents face potential entry by telecom overbuilders, the results were significant only when 
using the temporal variation in state video programming franchises.  There was little evidence 
that the incumbents relied on non-monotonic pricing to deter telecom entry.  A possible reason 
for this result may be that one or more of the model assumptions have been violated.  Future 
work will need to investigate this issue further.  In addition, the passage of state video 
programming franchises was treated as an exogenous event in the empirical section.  Future 
work will need to test this assumption and may rely on an instrument or other technique to deal 
with any potential endogeneity. 
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Monthly Fee ($) 14.75 9.69 0 123.95
Price [Predicted Ln(Monthly Fee+1)] 2.53 0.46 -3.30E-12 4.57
0 Cable Overbuilders in 100 miles 0.56 0.50 0 1
1 Cable Overbuilders in 100 miles 0.16 0.36 0 1
2 Cable Overbuilders in 100 miles 0.06 0.23 0 1
3 Cable Overbuilders in 100 miles 0.05 0.22 0 1
4+ Cable Overbuilders in 100 miles 0.17 0.38 0 1
0 Telecom Overbuilders in 100 miles 0.75 0.44 0 1
1 Telecom Overbuilders in 100 miles 0.17 0.38 0 1
2 Telecom Overbuilders in 100 miles 0.03 0.18 0 1
3 Telecom Overbuilders in 100 miles 0.03 0.16 0 1
4+ Telecom Overbuilders in 100 miles 0.02 0.13 0 1
Multimarket Contact (Cable) 0.38 0.49 0 1
Multimarket Contact (Telecom) 0.15 0.35 0 1
Homes Passed 16967.87 73316.04 9 4100000
Miles of Cable 251.59 786.68 0.3 29791
Municipal Utility 0.16 0.37 0 1
Duopoly 0.01 0.12 0 1
Private Overbuilder 0.01 0.10 0 1
No. Offair Channels 7.88 3.54 1 33
Share of Systems Owned in DMA 0.25 0.22 0.0016 1
Ln (Number of Systems Owned) 6.13 2.23 0.69 8.54
Population per Sq. Mile (County) 206.93 1134.16 0.1 66835
Median Income (County) 33172.88 7717.34 14178 77513
Percent Rural Population 5.69 6.34 0 55
N = 53,507
Table 1: Summary Statistics
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I II III IV
Municipal Utility -0.0095 -0.0220** -0.0210** -0.0248**
[0.0070] [0.0056] [0.0055] [0.0057]
No Cross Subsidy -0.0101
[0.0089]
Muni*No Cross Subsidy 0.0275
[0.0168]
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Service Level Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
DMA Fixed Effects N Y Y Y
System Characteristics N N Y Y
County Demographics N N Y Y
Observations 53507 53507 53507 53507
R-squared 0.6018 0.6175 0.6219 0.6220
Robust standard errors in brackets; clustered at state
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 2: Effect of Municipal Utility on Price
Dependent Variable: price
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I II III IV
Potential Telecom Overbuilders >0 0.0148 -0.0024 -0.0042 -0.0035
[0.0091] [0.0077] [0.0078] [0.0079]
State Franchise -0.0061
[0.0232]
State Franchise*Telecom>0 -0.1136**
[0.0192]
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Service Level Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
DMA Fixed Effects N Y Y Y
System Characteristics N N Y Y
County Demographics N N Y Y
Observations 53507 53507 53507 53507
R-squared 0.6023 0.6173 0.6219 0.6220
Robust standard errors in brackets; clustered at state
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 3a: Effect of Telecom Overbuilders within 100 miles on Price
Dependent Variable: price
 
 
Number of Potential Telecom 
Overbuilders in 100 Miles I II III
1 0.0106 -0.0023 -0.0041
[0.0079] [0.0078] [0.0081]
2 -0.0057 -0.0142 -0.0167
[0.0166] [0.0115] [0.0113]
3 0.0387 0.0135 0.0123
[0.0270] [0.0231] [0.0237]
4+ 0.033 0.0023 0.0009
[0.0292] [0.0231] [0.0211]
Test: Bin2 = Bin4+ 0.2361 0.4269 0.3634
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Service Level Fixed Effects Y Y Y
DMA Fixed Effects N Y Y
System Characteristics N N Y
County Demographics N N Y
Observations 53507 53507 53507
R-squared 0.6021 0.6174 0.6220
Robust standard errors in brackets; clustered at state
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 3b: Effect of Telecom Overbuilders within 100 miles on Price
Dependent Variable: price
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I II III IV
Potential Cable Overbuilders >0 -0.0206* -0.0051 -0.0078 -0.0116
[0.0091] [0.0071] [0.0068] [0.0075]
State Franchise -0.0202
[0.0227]
State Franchise*Cable>0 0.0296+
[0.0168]
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Service Level Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
DMA Fixed Effects N Y Y Y
System Characteristics N N Y Y
County Demographics N N Y Y
Observations 53507 53507 53507 53507
R-squared 0.6023 0.6173 0.6219 0.6220
Robust standard errors in brackets; clustered at state
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4a: Effect of Cable Overbuilders within 100 miles on Price
Dependent Variable: price
 
 
Number of Potential Cable 
Overbuilders in 100 Miles I II III
1 -0.0193* -0.0054 -0.0076
[0.0090] [0.0074] [0.0070]
2 -0.0099 -0.0028 -0.0034
[0.0175] [0.0100] [0.0106]
3 -0.0218 -0.0129 -0.017
[0.0145] [0.0123] [0.0124]
4+ -0.0286* -0.0014 -0.0057
[0.0124] [0.0110] [0.0110]
Test: Bin1 = Bin4+ 0.5053 0.6520 0.8355
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Service Level Fixed Effects Y Y Y
DMA Fixed Effects N Y Y
System Characteristics N N Y
County Demographics N N Y
Observations 53507 53507 53507
R-squared 0.6025 0.6173 0.622
Robust standard errors in brackets; clustered at state
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4b: Effect of Cable Overbuilders within 100 miles on Price
Dependent Variable: price
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I II
Potential Telecom Overbuilders >0 -0.0018 Potential Cable Overbuilders >0 -0.0075
[0.0079] [0.0068]
MMC*Potential Telecom Overbuilders >0 -0.0387** MMC*Potential Cable Overbuilders >0 -0.0097
[0.0131] [0.0109]
Test for equality of coefficients: 0.0334 Test for equality of coefficients: 0.8595
Year Fixed Effects Y Year Fixed Effects Y
Service Level Fixed Effects Y Service Level Fixed Effects Y
DMA Fixed Effects Y DMA Fixed Effects Y
System Characteristics Y System Characteristics Y
County Demographics Y County Demographics Y
Observations 53507 Observations 53507
R-squared 0.6225 R-squared 0.6220
Robust standard errors in brackets; clustered at state Robust standard errors in brackets; clustered at state
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 5a: Effect of Multi-market Contact on Price
Dependent Variable: price
 
 
Number of Potential Telecom Overbuilders in 
100 Miles I
Number of Potential Cable Overbuilders in 
100 Miles II
1 0.0063 1 -0.0007
[0.0075] [0.0097]
2 -0.005 2 -0.0057
[0.0113] [0.0144]
3 0.0138 3 -0.0099
[0.0289] [0.0213]
4+ 0.0142 4+ -0.0064
[0.0257] [0.0114]
MMC*0 -0.0239+ MMC*0 -0.0063
[0.0136] [0.0142]
MMC*1 -0.0703** MMC*1 -0.0221
[0.0211] [0.0152]
MMC*2 -0.0649* MMC*2 -0.0035
[0.0303] [0.0219]
MMC*3 -0.0254 MMC*3 -0.0225
[0.0315] [0.0300]
MMC*4+ -0.0665* MMC*4+ -0.0056
[0.0254] [0.0148]
Year Fixed Effects Y Year Fixed Effects Y
Service Level Fixed Effects Y Service Level Fixed Effects Y
DMA Fixed Effects Y DMA Fixed Effects Y
System Characteristics Y System Characteristics Y
County Demographics Y County Demographics Y
Observations 53507 Observations 53507
R-squared 0.6227 R-squared 0.6220
Robust standard errors in brackets; clustered at state Robust standard errors in brackets; clustered at state
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 5b: Effect of Multi-market Contact on Price
Dependent Variable: price
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Number of Potential 
Telecom Overbuilders 
in 100 Miles
Test for 
Coefficient 
Equality (p-
values)
Number of Potential 
Cable Overbuilders in 
100 Miles
Test for 
Coefficient 
Equality (p-
values)
1 1
1*MMC 1*MMC
2 2
2*MMC 2*MMC
3 3
3*MMC 3*MMC
4+ 4+
4+*MMC 4+*MMC
Coefficients from Table 5b are tested for equality.
0.4882 0.7755
0.0999 0.9826
0.0024 0.3356
0.1141 0.9523
Table 5c: Effect of Multimarket Contact on Price
I II
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Fig. 1: Distribution of Number of Overbuilders in 100 miles, by Type
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